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ARGUMENT 
Appellant Warr makes the following points in reply to 
the arguments raised in the response briefs, Brief of Respon-
dents , Boyce and Connell, and Brief of Respondent J. H. Ehlers. 
POINT ONE 
RESPONDENT EHLERS1 ARGUMENT AT POINT ONE IS NOT PROPERLY 
BEFORE THE COURT BECAUSE HE HAS NOT CROSS-APPEALED FROM THE JUDG-
MENT ENTERED AGAINST HIM. 
In the proceedings below in the District Court, the res-
pondents moved the Court to dismiss Warr's brossclaim for 
failure to state a claim. It was claimed that because Warr 
failed to tender the balance due under the real estate contracts, 
his pleadings did not state a cause of action. This motion was 
denied by the Court and a judgment for contract damages was later 
entered by the District Court. Respondents again raise this 
issue before this Court. However, because the respondents did 
not cross-appeal from the judgment entered in the District Court, 
they should now be precluded from attacking the validity of the 
judgment for contract damages. 
The respondents are saying that Warr's only remedy 
is for rescission of the contract. However, Warr has never asked 
for rescission of the contract. Moreover, the Court awarded 
damages for breach of contract. The respondents' argument 
attachs the validity of any judgment for contract damages. 
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Both federal and Utah law recognize that a respondent 
may not attack a judgment when he has not sought relief from 
the appellate court by appeal. The United States Supreme Court 
in Letulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1940) , recognized this 
principal when the Court stated: 
A respondent or an appellee may urge any matter 
appearing in the record in support of a judgment, 
but he may not attack it even on grounds asserted 
in the court below, in an effort to have this Court 
reverse it, when he himself has not sought review 
of the whole judgment, or of that portion which 
is adverse to him. 
308 U.S. at 421-22. 
This Court has recognized the same principal in Federal 
Land Bank v. Sorenson, 101 Utah 305, 121 P.2d 398 (1942). In 
that case, the plaintiff bank was awarded a judgment for recovery 
of possession of certain real property. On appeal, the plain-
tiff argued that the judgment should be amended to provide for 
the recovery of additional rentals, but because the plaintiff 
had made no cross-assignments of error and had taken no cross-
appeal, this Court held that the matter was not before it. 
To the same effect is Ludlow v. Colorado Animal By-Product 
Co., 104 Utah 221, 137 P.2d 347 (1943), where this Court held 
that it was not required to decide whether the district court 
erred in not granting injunctive relief where the plaintiff-res-
pondent failed to cross-appeal for the failure to receive injunc-
tive relief after the defendant-appellant appealed the award of 
damages against it. 
See also, generally, 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and Error 
§ 707 (1962). 
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POINT TWO 
FORMAL TENDER OF AMOUNTS DUE UNDER THE CONTRACT WAS NOT 
REQUIRED BECAUSE SUCH A TENDER WOULD HAVE BEEN AN IDLE CEREMONY 
AND OF NO AVAIL 
If the Court believes that the matter of tender of amounts 
due under the real estate contract is an issue to be considered 
here, it is submitted that Warr was justified in not making a 
formal tender because such a tender would have been an idle cere-
mony and of no avail. After the district court had entered its 
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on their adverse possession 
claim, respondents no longer had title to the property, and it 
was clear from that point forward that any effort to tender the 
balance of the purchase price would have proven fruitless. 
The familiar rule is that the law does not require one 
to do a vain or useless thing and excuses the making of a formal 
tender which would otherwise be required, where it is reasonably 
plain and clear that if made, such a tender would be an idle cere-
mony and of no avail. A recent case in point is Leger Construction 
Inc. v. Roberts, Inc., 550 P.2d 212 (Utah 1976), where the plain-
tiff claimed that the defendant would have been entitled to an 
extension of time under his construction contract only if he had 
asked for it in writing. In response, the Court noted the facts 
that the plaintiff had failed to pay the balance on the contract, 
that he had filed a legal action and that he had alleged in his 
complaint that the defendant failed to comply with the contract 
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despite the plaintiff's repeated demand upon him to do so. The 
Court held that these facts 
make it obvious that if Roberts had asked for an 
extension, it would have been an idle gesture and 
was unnecessary under the principle that the law 
will not require one to do a useless or impossible 
thing. 
550 P.2d at 214. To the same effect is Hansen v. Christensen, 
545 P.2d 1152 (Utah 1976), where this Court stated: 
Where the unreasonable conduct of the obligee would 
make an actual tender a fruitless gesture, an 
offer to comply with the terms of the contract by 
the obligor is sufficient 
545 P.2d at 1154. 
Warr was ready and able to tender the payments required 
to satisfy the contracts. (Tr. 52, 53) However, the respondents 
were no longer able to deliver title to the property, the Court 
having declared ownership in the plaintiffs. It clearly would 
have been a fruitless and idle gesture to tender the balance due 
under the contract to vendors who no longer had title and who 
would have been required to pay multiples of the contract price 
in order to purchase the property from the plaintiffs if the 
plaintiffs were even willing to sell. Respondents have shown 
their unwillingness to have made such a purchase by their refusal 
to pay damages under a "benefit of the bargain" rule. They cannot 
now be heard to require tender in a situation where they could 
not and would not have performed. 
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POINT THREE 
WARR WAS ENTITLED TO TREAT THE REAL ESTATE CONTRACTS AS 
BROKEN BECAUSE THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY THAT THE RESPONDENTS 
WOULD BE ABLE TO CONVEY GOOD TITLE. 
This Court in the case of Corporation Nine v. Taylor, 
30 Utah 2d 47, 513 P.2d 417 (1973), stated: 
First, the law does not require the vendor to have 
clear and marketable title at all times during the 
performance of his contract, and is not ordinarily 
so obliged until the time comes for him to perform. 
The buyer should not be heard to complain unless it 
appears that it will be impossible or at least 
highly unlikely that the seller will be able to 
perform his contract when he is called upon to do 
so • . . . 
513 P.2d at 421 (emphasis added). 
In American Savings & Loan Association v. Blomquist, 24 
Utah 2d 35, 465 P.2d 353 (1970), this Court shed light on the 
meaning of the phrase "impossible or at least highly unlikely" 
for the seller to perform his contract. In that case, the defen-
dant Blomquist mortgaged his home to the American Savings & Loan 
Association. After making a few payments he went into default. 
American Savings then sought to foreclose on the property. 
While the foreclosure procedure was pending, Blomquist 
sold his home to Sellars on contract. American Savings later 
added Sellars as a defendant in the foreclosure action. Upon 
being notified of this, Sellars refused to continue making payments 
to Blomquist. Blomquist then brought action against Sellars to 
foreclose, and Sellars counterclaimed against Blomquist for breach 
of contract, claiming that Blomquist was unable to deliver good 
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title to the property. Blomquist argued that Sellars could not 
bring an action until he had made or tendered all payments on the 
property and that although the property was foreclosed, it was 
still possible for him (Blomquist) to redeem the property. It 
appears, however, that such a possibility could not reasonably 
give much hope to Sellars, because the Court said: 
In the circumstances discussed above, where the 
vendors (Blomquists) had first been guilty of 
such a substantial breach of their obligations 
under the contract, and where it appeared to be 
an obviously futile thing for the Sellars to con-
tinue making payments, it was not obligatory upon 
them to do so; but they were entitled to treat 
the contract as broken, refuse further performance 
and seek redress in damages resulting to them for 
the breach. 
465 P.2d at 355-56 
In the instant case, following the judgment for the plain-
tiffs of adverse possession, the respondents had no interest 
remaining in the property. If the respondents were to perform, 
they would have to obtain title from the plaintiffs. However, 
such a possibility should be considered insignificant here in 
that no evidence was presented in trial that the plaintiffs were 
willing to sell the property and because, most probably, the 
respondents would have had to pay as much to purchase the property 
as Warr has asked for damages in this action. That this is true 
is borne out by the sale of the property in question by plaintiffs 
to a third party subsequent to the trial in this case. Because 
the respondents are unwilling to pay the damages as asked by Warr, 
there is no reason to believe they would have purchased the prop-
erty at a similar price from the plaintiffs. Therefore, in line 
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with the American Savings case, Warr should now be able to seek 
redress in damages. 
Although the issues of tender and ripeness for decision 
are not now properly before this Court, as stated in Point One 
above, Points Two and Three show that Utah law would allow Warr 
to obtain contract damages against the respondents, 
POINT FOUR 
THE RESPONDENTS HAVE MISSTATED THE CASE OF BUNNELL V. BILLS 
CONCERNING ITS EFFECT ON THE MEASURE OF CONTRACT DAMAGES. 
The case of Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597 
(1962), is Utah authority directly on point that the "benefit of 
the bargain" rule should be applied in determining damages in this 
case. The respondents, in an attempt to distinguish the Bunnell 
case, misstate the facts or draw unsupported inferences therefrom. 
In Bunnell, Bills sold certain real property to Stevens 
on contract. Subsequently, Stevens contracted to sell this prop-
erty to Bunnell. Later, Stevens became aware that he would not 
be able to meet his obligations under the contract with Bills. 
Bills and Stevens worked out a rescission agreement so that 
Stevens could receive back his $10,000 down payment. Bills then 
entered into a contract to sell the property to another party. 
This, however, did not resolve the problem with the contract 
between Stevens and Bunnell. In Bunnell's action against Stevens, 
this Court affirmed the trial court's decision that Stevens had 
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breached his contract with Bunnell and that he should be required 
to compensate Bunnell according to the "benefit of the bargain" 
rule. 
In the instant case, the respondents breached their con-
tract with Warr when it became impossible for them to convey the 
real property in question. The only significant difference between 
the two cases is that in Bunnell the seller was unable to convey 
good title because the agreement to purchase for himself had 
been rescinded; in the instant case, the respondents were not 
able to convey good title because the plaintiffs had taken title 
by adverse possession. 
Respondents Boyce and Connell, at page 5 of their brief, 
state that Bunnell involved a "bad faith" situation because of 
the "underhandedness of the seller in selling to a second buyer 
without regard to the rights of a prior buyer." These respondents 
obviously misread the case. Stevens did not sell to a second 
buyer. He was the major defendant in the case, the one who directly 
breached his contract with Bunnell. Although Bills contracted 
with a third party after Stevens and he rescinded their contract, 
Bills1 involvement in the case was as a conspirator to induce the 
breach of contract between Stevens and Bunnell. This Court held 
that Bills was justified in his action and hence not liable. Also, 
there is nothing in the case that suggests that Stevens acted in 
"bad faith." A seller is not in bad faith in entering a contract 
to convey real property when he does not have title to that prop-
erty if he reasonably believes that he can obtain title when it 
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comes time for him to perform. Therefore, Stevens was not in 
bad faith by signing the contract with Bunnell. Although it 
later developed that Stevens was unable to meet the payments due 
under his contract with Bills, there is no statement or inference 
therefrom that would indicate that he had any doubt about being 
able to meet his payments at the time he contracted with Bunnell. 
There simply is nothing in the Bunnell case to indicate that 
this Court believed that Stevens was acting in "bad faith." 
Respondent Ehlers, in his brief, at page 9, claims that 
Bunnell involved "bad faith" on the part of the vendor and that 
Stevens "must have known that he would never receive legal title 
to the property due to his financial situation." Again, it must 
be said that the Court makes no mention of "bad faith." More-
over , there is no indication from the case that Stevens should 
have known at the time he entered his contract with Bunnell that 
he would never receive legal title to the property due to his 
financial situation. This is merely conjecture on the part of 
Ehlers. 
It is submitted that Bunnell puts Utah among those juris-
dictions that follow the "benefit of the bargain" rule in situa-
tions not involving bad faith. 
POINT FIVE 
RESPONDENTS SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ARGUE THAT THE TIME 
OF THE BREACH WAS AT THE TIME THE CONTRACT WAS SIGNED BECAUSE 
THIS CONTENTION WAS NOT MADE IN THE TRIAL COURT BELOW. 
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Respondent Ehlers, in Point Three of his brief, attempts 
to establish the date of the contract as the date that the fair 
market value of the property should be determined. However, 
none of the respondents raised this issue in the trial court 
below. In fact, Warren D. Osgood, Warr's expert witness as to 
the value of the real property, testified concerning the present 
value of the property, not the value of the property at the time 
the contract was signed. None of the respondents objected to 
his testimony on that basis, although several objections as to 
his qualifications, the foundation for his opinion, the value of 
other pieces of property, and hearsay were made. (Tr. 20-32) 
Moreover, Mr. Boyce, counsel for respondent Ehlers, represented 
that his witness as to the value of the property, Mr. Stan 
LeCheminant, would testify that the property was worth $6,000 
per acre without access. (Tr. 64-65) Mr. LeCheminant's testi-
mony as to value must refer to the same point in time as that 
of Mr. Osgood because Mr. Osgood also testified that without 
access, the property would only be worth about $6,500 per acre. 
(Tr. 26) 
Furthermore, it should be noted that Ehlers1 Memorandum 
fo the Court, submitted in lieu of closing argument, at pages 
3 and 4, argues that the maximum damages that can be recovered 
are $6,500 per acre, stating that Warr's expert testified that 
"without the adjacent acquisition, the present market value" is 
$6,500 per acre. 
Because the respondents have not argued the time of the 
breach in the Court below, they should not be allowed to raise 
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The fact that the plaintiffs had possession of the prop-
erty or that the plaintiffs had commenced an action to quiet 
title did not mean that the respondents would not be able to 
deliver title to the property. It was not until the Court had 
entered its judgment against the respondents and the time for 
appeal had run that it was clear the respondents would not be 
able to deliver title to the property. 
Prior to judgment in favor of plaintiff in this case, 
Warr had no right to rescind the contracts because any attempt to 
rescind would have been met with an action for damages by the 
respondents. Moreover, whether the respohdehts would have succeeded 
against the plaintiffs below on the adverse possession question 
depended on facts over which Warr had no control and of which he 
had no knowledge except through the respondents. The fact that 
the respondents defended against the claim of the plaintiffs to 
the extent of going to trial shows that they believed they had a 
good defense to the adverse possession claim. 
The case law also supports the concept that Warr would not 
have been able to succeed in an action against respondents before 
the appeal time had run on the judgment because a vendor need 
not be able to deliver title to the property until he is required 
to transfer title. See Leavitt v. Blohm, 11 Utah 2d 220, 375 
P.2d 190 (1960); Woodard v. Allen, 1 Utah 2d 220, 265 P.2d 398 
(1953). Under the "benefit of the bargain" rule, damages should 
be determined as of the time of the breach. Because the breach 
did not occur until the time for appeal had expired on the judg-
ment for adverse possession, the value of the property should 
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Boyce and Connell that they promised to give only a special war-
ranty deed to Warr. They now argue in Point One of their brief 
that this promise to give a special warranty deed insulates them 
from damages. However, Boyce and Connell have not cross-appealed 
from the judgment of the Court. Therefore, they are precluded 
from raising that argument before this Court. See the arguments 
raised in Point One above. 
POINT EIGHT 
A COVENANT OF SPECIAL WARRANTY DOES NOT PUT A VENDEE ON 
NOTICE OR INQUIRY OF DEFECTS OF TITLE 
Even if the issue of the special warranty is properly 
before the Court, that matter should be resolved in favor of Warr 
because a covenant of special warranty does not put a vendee 
on notice or upon inquiry as to defects of title. A case in 
point is Paul v. Houston Oil Co., 211 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1948), where the Court stated: 
It is true that this deed contains a special war-
ranty but under the great weight of authority, such 
special warranty does not carry any notice of defects 
of title to the grantee. The rule is: "So, too, 
a 'special warranty deed1—that is to say, one that 
is in terms a general warranty deed except that it 
warrants the title only against those claiming 
'by, through or under' the grantor—conveys the 
land itself; the limited warranty does not, of 
itself, carry notice of defects of title." 
211 S.W.2d at 356. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that Warr was put on notice of 
possible defects by the special warranty covenant, this does not 
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o i t h e C o n c l u s i o n s of Law in t h e p r i n c i p a l a c t i o n shows t h a t t h e 
p l a i n t i f f s , and no j">th_erai, H m e l y p.iii1 Hie | i n p e r l y lu:.vu 1 r , 
I U U L , '..hi.; y e a r s of J9bH ainl l"< i i n c l u s i v e , , and t h a t Uu s 
was t h e r e a s o n t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f s were e n t i t l e d t o j udgmen t . 
"If Mi i y co li ml pi in in III in mi uu mi in ill i in i in in iKMidiiJ in r e s p o n -
d e n t s Boyco ami Conine! te p l a i n t i f f s w o u l d n o t h a v e he*en s u c -
c e s s f u l in t h e i r c l a i m for a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n Moreover , had 
r p i]nr*»ii.( lr »p f ' I tr i1 > f M J I I il I i 111111 II II II i > i i II i i II i i i i I i | I  : I | (\\\\ \\ m i ; i q \ j \g 
property from and after the date they obtained control of the 
property unMl the time1 of sale io Jefuuhnil Uait, any rLiim 
c > - VJ possession would IIUM/I, he.cn negated by a claim of adverse 
possession against the plaintiffs. Fur ther, although Boy ce knew 
-15-
that respondent Ehlers was a part owner in the property in ques-
tion, Boyce had no discussions with Ehlers, as to the payment 
of taxes or otherwise, prior to the trial on the principal action. 
(Tr. 39-40) It would have been so easy for the respondents to 
stop the adverse possession of the plaintiffs, but they failed 
to do so* 
Because the acts that caused the respondents Boyce and 
Connell to lose the property and that gave title to the plain-
tiffs occurred through or under respondents Boyce and Connell, 
they must answer in damages to Warr based upon the "benefit of 
the bargain" rule. 
POINT NINE 
REGARDLESS OF THEORY OF RECOVERY, THE APPELLANT IS 
ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS. 
None of the respondents responded directly to appellant's 
argument that he is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and 
costs based on the contracts between respondents and appellant. 
Their basic argument, of the respondents is that because the 
Lower Court did not award appellant all that he had asked for, 
attorney's fees should not be granted. 
This lame argument completely ignores the explicit 
language of the contracts in question which provide for attorney's 
fees and costs in the event of a default. The Court below 
specifically found such a default, as discussed in Points Three 
and Four of appellant's brief. The case is therefore clear; 
there was a breach for which Warr is entitled to attorney's 
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f e e s and c o s t s -Any d i s c u s s i o n of s e t t l e m e n t o f f e r s i s ex t rnn^ov is 
nnd r-uii/ei If I in ir-i,, Tin i i l | i|in h i u ui ul ui. each lias been r e s o l v e d 
in f avor of Wan", 
POTI IT TEN . . : , •' 
• ' • I IH BARGAIN" DAMAGES ARE NOT AWARDED, 
THE JUDGMK'^ ' SHOULD :<- I N C R E A S E D . 
1
 ihiiikKH'S nit I u In ri. t d i u e d ui t h i s 
c a s e , a l l par. L i e s aqi eu cha t damages of $ 8 , 2 4 9 . 8 0 a r e i n s u f f i c i e n t 
F i l l e r s & • ' - ••f1"1 o t h e r w i s e ; Hoyro and forme 11 st , 
I lu> 11 i in i in i in I in in i. soi t LMI in Lilt judgment were t a r n i s h e d by Wan; diid 
t h a t Boyce and C o n n e l l a r e " w i l l i n g t o pay o r r e p a y t h e d i f f e r -
on no hotwrrv H1. r . < ' ' ' » j " 1 » j n u , * • \" M " " , . te" • -if " n"" ii I , "; 
t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s payments on d i e c o n t r a c t , " (Br ie t of Boyce and 
C o n n e l l , P . 8) 
CONCLUSION 
A p p e i, I an,!, W.,i 1II in ...vnti 1 Led to damages from the respond-
ents under the "benefit of the bargain"1 rule to compensate him 
because ho has been depri "*r'i;Ml of 1 lie benef i I of a qnnd i r z 
duo u u o n , There i s no adequate reason to deny Warr the 
portion of his damages under an anomoly j.n I he law of 6av-aqe9 
applied by only a fo'i t isl ales Utah I i\ (IB urine IJ ) sugujet 
the "beneLit ok the bargain" rule should be followed ever \ :* : 
"good faith" case, *-*.~r * a f,qood faith" exception is - - , 
11 ] 11111 i 11 I i 11 *:'" - - UK> u J11 111) L JJu c on side r e d 
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faith" because adverse possession in Utah can be avoided by 
the simple act of paying taxesf which the respondents neglected 
to do. Warr should not be forced to suffer for their neglect. 
Respectfully submitted, 
v A 
Joseph C/ Rust 
C_l (fy^Aot 
\.Westerby A David A 
KIRTONf McCONKIE, BOYER & BOYLE 
Attorneys for Warr 
-18-
